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THE SUPREME COURT: STATESMEN
AND JUSTICES
ROBERT G. WECLEW*
CRITICISMRSPONSIBLE criticism made of the Supreme Court's opinion writ-
ing in 1958 would probably command somewhat general agree-
ment today. Some of the suggestions offered in that year in-
cluded the following: there should be fewer essays written with
greater care given to those prepared; more advantage should be taken
of the case-to-case development of the law; contradictory holdings
and misleading generalizations should be reduced; past Court holdings,
opinions and doctrines should be given greater respect without re-
stricting the Court's freedom to overrule; and inquiry should be made
as to the Court's tendency toward manipulating technical doctrines in
order to produce substantive results in given cases.'
Intemperate judgment during the first session of the 89th Congress
by presumably responsible legislators would command considerably
less agreement in most quarters. This censure went beyond criticism
of opinion writing and included criticism of judicial experience, func-
tions and powers, as well as the role of the Court. In discussing legis-
lation relating to an increase in the salaries of Supreme Court justices,
many derogatory comments were made on the floor of the House of
Representatives. One legislator said that, since they legislate on every-
thing else and disregard the Constitution, let them legislate on their
own salaries.2 Another said that if "they are going to assume the leg-
1 1 DAVIs, ADMINISTRATIvE LAW v. (1959).
2 111 CONG. REC. 5127 (daily ed. March 17, 1965) (remarks of Representative Jones
from Mo.).
* MR. WECLEW is an Associate Professor of Law at De Paul University. He received
his ].D. from Northwestern University. He is a member of the Illinois Bar.
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islative function, let them be paid on that basis." 3 It was also stated
that members of the Court have no basis for assuming that they are
the best lawyers in the country, when many lawyers in the House
are far superior to them.4 "[Olf the nine members of the U.S. Su-
preme Court, there is a total of 13 years' prior judicial experience if
you count 1 year as a police judge for Justice Black .... And of those
nine members, one member, Justice Brennan, has had well over half
of that total experience, he having had 7 years prior judicial experi-
ence."'5 Another criticism expressed was that the members of the
Court had not been performing duties which were set forth for them
in the Constitution, and lawyers, due to overturned decisions, could
not determine what was the law of the land.6
Other opinions as expressed below are highly questionable. One
expressed the view that the Court "has no right to reverse an initial
decision ascertaining intent and extracting a constitutional principle
and thereby in effect to amend the Constitution."7 Stated as a truism
was that the Constitution and its amendments always retain the same
meaning that they had when they were adopted.8 Another equally
disputable comment asserts that:
[tihe Supreme Court violated the law of legal precedent by ignoring and re-
fusing to follow its own prior decisions which hold that separate but equal
school facilities met Constitutional requirements under the 14th Amendment;
it violated the law by its usurpation and exercise of power and authority that
was never intended that it should have or exercise by the framers and adopters
of the Constitution ... "
The following casts doubt on whether it is a legitimate function
of the Court to make policy at all: "In his sophomore year he [Mr.
Justice Goldberg] gave ample evidence that he would run second to
none in effectuating reforms in our body politic."" ° It is unfair to say
I d. at 5127 (remarks of Representative Waggonner from La.).
4 Id. at 5132 (remarks of Representative Jones from Mo.).
5 Id. at 5133 (remarks of Representative Ichord from Mo.).
o Id. at 5135 (remarks of Representative Jones from Mo.).
7 Nichols, An Appeal to Save Our Written Constitutional Form of Government, 13
DE PAtL L. REv. 15, 16 (1963).
s Id. at 20.
9 Id. at 27.
10 Kurland, The Supreme Court, 1963 Term, Forcword: Equal in Origin and Equal
in Title to the Legislative and Executive Branches of the Government, 78 HARV. L.
REv. 143, 160 (1964).
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of the Court that it "will continue to play the role of the omniscient
and strive toward omnipotence.""
RENUNCIATION
The Justices over the years have adopted rules and processes, not
only to control their calendar, but to control untoward extensions
of their judicial and political power. In many instances, they have
declined to use power that resided in the Court. The refusal to render
advisory opinions has been long established and continues as an un-
questioned doctrine." In 1938, the opinion of Mr. Justice Brandeis in
Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins13 halted the development of a body
of federal common law in diversity cases, and stated that the law to
be applied was the law of the state, thus stifling the trend toward a
federal common law begun with the decision of Swift v. Tyson.' 4
The doctrine of the "political question," developed in Luther v.
Borden, 5 is a renunciation of power. Deference to executive discretion
is exemplified in United States v. California Eastern Line, Inc. 6 The
"standing" requirement and insulation of federal spending from state
or individual attack are not vehicles for the use of increased judicial
power.'7 Ex parte McCardle,8 giving Congress virtually complete
control over the Court's appellate jurisdiction, has not been overruled.
The "case or controversy" and "ripeness" requirements continue as
self-imposed limitations on the Court's reception of a case.' 9 The "pre-
sumed validity" rule of Williamson v. Lee Optical of Oklahoma20 is
virtually the death knell of substantive economic due process. The
Court's invitations to the political processes of the states to resolve
problems before the court takes further action, after its initial handling
of the problem, indicate a deference to the state. The court will not
interfere in the matter unless the state is unable to resolve the problel
or lacks the inclination to do so. In Baker v. Carr,2 the holding that
11 Id. at 175.
12 Alabama v. Arizona, 291 U.S. 286 (1934).
13 304 U.S. 64 (1938). 15 48 U.S. (7 How.) I (1849).
14 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842). 16 348 U.S. 351 (1955).
17 Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447 (1923).
18 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506 (1869).
19 International Longshoremcn's Union v. Boyd, 347 U.S. 222 (1954).
20 348 U,S, 483 (1955). 21369 U.S. 186 (1962).
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there was standing, jurisdiction and justiciability had the effect of
inviting the states to use their power to remove invidious discrimina-
tion in the distribution of voting strength. The Brown v. Board of
Education cases22 were also matters in which the Court moved slowly,
so as to allow the states time to move with "all deliberate speed."
Someone has suggested that the states have been allowed so much
leeway that now "all deliberate speed" serves the same ends that
"separate but equal" served before. In the field of the administration
of criminal justice the Court has given warning and encouragement to
the states to reexamine their constitutional standards. For example, the
Court, in Elkins v. United States,23 abolished the "silver platter" doc-
trine, thereby giving notice that the fourth amendment might be ab-
sorbed into the fourteenth amendment, and it was so absorbed with
reference to state action in 1961.24
Mr. Justice Brandeis, in his concurring opinion in Ashwander v.
Tennessee Valley Authority,25 set forth rules under which the Court
would refuse to exercise jurisdiction over constitutional questions un-
doubtedly within its jurisdiction. These rules, in substance, are that
friendly, non-adversary proceedings cannot set the stage for consti-
tutional proceedings, a constitutional question will not be anticipated
before it is necessary to decide it, the decision of the Court will be no
broader than required, a dispute will be decided upon a nonconstitu-
tional ground if one exists, one must show injury to be entitled to raise
a constitutional question, one who takes the benefits of a statute cannot
question its constitutionality, and the Court will avoid determining a
statute's constitutionality by adopting a construction which avoids
the constitutional issue if such action is possible.
Thus, it would seem that there is a continuing history of Court
refusal to exercise power and authority it could exercise. Relinquish-
ment of power and self-restraint are not evidences of "usurpation."
POLITICAL
Politics is the art of the possible, and the possible entails compro-
mises that will enable the political processes to work. Inevitably,
compromises have their imperfections, mistakes and margins of error.
Since the Supreme Court is part of the political process, compromises
22 347 U.S. 483 (1954); 349 U.S. 294 (1955). 23 364 U.S. 206 (1960).
24 Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
25 297 U.S. 288, 346-48 (1936).
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are often necessary to get a majority decision. However, there must
be some final authority to provide the answers to pressing social prob-
lems that cannot, or will not, be answered by the other organs of the
body politic, even though compromise and mistake are sometimes part
of the end product.
The Court has been arriving at political decisions ever since Mar-
bury v. Madison,26 wherein it set itself above the other two branches
as the final authority in regard to the meaning of the Constitution.
This was the beginning of the Court's trip down the long, wavering
path of deciding where certain powers should be lodged when called
upon in the appropriate case or controversy. Moreover the tools,
mechanisms and craftsmanship of the lawyer are used to arrive at
what are usually political decisions with regard to solving problems
between branches of government, between a branch of government
and a person, and between persons. The lawyer realizes that his case
will be decided according to certain legal rules, principles, and tradi-
tions; but even the better lawyer, who recognizes the relevant law
well in advance, knows that he will not be able to discern what the
judgment will be in his own case.27 The following illustrates the role
of politics in this legal picture:
A "constitution" is a matter of purest politics, a structure of power. "Law" is
the machinery-courts and concepts, steel bars and statutes-for dealing with
conflict between man and man, and with infractions of public order. The term
"constitutional law" symbolizes an intersection of law and politics, wherein
issues of political power are acted upon by persons, trained in legal tradition,
working in political institutions, following the procedures of the law, thinking
as lawyers think.2 8
[The Supreme Court] is at once a judicial and political body. It is judicial in
that its usages are of a court of law .... It is political in that its orders extend far
beyond the individuals immediately involved; it fixes conditions and sets bounds
about the resort to law; it revises the pattern of separation of powers among
the agencies of government; it endows with intent, discovers latent meaning
and resolves conflicts between legislative acts; it invokes Constitution, statute,
its own decisions, to hold Congress, department, administrative body in place.
Even when it imposes self-denial upon itself, politically it extends the frontiers
of some other agency of control. Judgments along these lines are political, not
legal, decisions. Issues of due process, equal protection, privileges and immunities
are questions of the limits of the province of government. 29
26 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137 (1803).
27 The Supreme Court in the American Constitutional System, 33 NOTRE DAME LAW.
521,553 (1958).
28 BLACK, PERSPECTIVES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 (1963).
29 Hamilton and Braden, The Special Competence of the Supreme Court, 50 YALE
L.J. 1319, 1324 (1941).
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American constitutional law is primarily political theory dressed in lawyers'
language, and ... justices of the United States Supreme Court, when they act
in constitutional law cases, deal with juristic theories of politics. . . . Juristic
theories of politics are propositions of political theories put into terms of rights
and obligations.8 0
The Court is a part of the political process as are the governmental
agencies, the Congress and the President.
JUDICIAL
It is not necessary that Supreme Court justices have prior judicial
experience. In their dual role of judge and statesman, some of the
finest have served without judicial experience, including Justices
Frankfurter, Stone, Warren, Brandeis, Taney, Story, and Marshall.
Mr. Justice Frankfurter said that one "is entitled to say without quali-
fication that the correlation between prior judicial experience and
fitness for the function of the Supreme Court is zero. '31 Wisdom,
objectivity, knowledge of life, a sense of professional responsibility,
an appreciation of the traditions and techniques of the law, broadness
of experience, knowledge of history and logic, a sense of values, a
strong conviction as to the role of the Court, judicial integrity, and
a sense of duty, morality and ethics are all important if the justice is
successfully to complete his work.
Theodore Roosevelt recognized and emphasized the political con-
sideration in the appointment of a justice when, speaking of Justice
Holmes, he said: "I should hold myself guilty of an irreparable wrong
to the nation if I should put... [in this vacancy] any man who was
not absolutely sane and sound on the great national policies for which
we stand in public life. ' 32 Again it is social philosophy, and not ju-
dicial experience, that the same president emphasized in a message to
Congress:
The chief lawmakers in our country may be, and often are the judges, be-
cause they are the final seat of authority. Every time they interpret contract,
property, vested rights, due process of law, liberty, they necessarily enact into
law parts of a system of social philosophy, and as such interpretation is funda-
mental, they give direction to all lawmaking. The decisions of the courts on
economics and social questions depend upon their economic and social philos-
30 Latham, The Supreme Court as a Political Institution, 31 MIu. L. REv. 205, 205-
6 (1947).
81 Frankfurter, The Supreme Court in the Mirror of the Justices, VITAL SPEECHES
OF "ic DAY, 434, 436 (1942).
32 CAIR, THE SUPREME COuRT AND JUDICIAL R~vmw 239 (1942).
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ophy; and for the peaceful progress of our people during the twentieth century
we shall owe most to those judges who hold to a twentieth century economic
and social philosophy and not to a long outgrown philosophy, which was itself
the product of primitive and social conditions.
33
LEGISLATING
Separation of powers does not prevent the justices from legislating.
In the tradition of the common law, they may make law on a case-
to-case basis. They make law when there is no law on the subject,
when there are conflicting precedents, when Congress fails or refuses
to legislate,"4 when Congress cannot conceivably legislate in detail a
and where Congress, aware of the problem, is seemingly inviting the
Court to manage it.3 6
While the nine men on the Court, with their varying backgrounds
and philosophies, make law, they do so within the confines of legal
techniques and traditions, as well as the "case or controversy" require-
ment. Mr. Justice Holmes realized that judges are lawmakers when
he said "I recognize without hesitation that judges must and do
legislate .... -37
Moreover, legislatures, courts and governmental agencies have all
created laws in the fields where administrative law applies. All issues
not covered by statute can be decided by the courts no matter how
narrow or unique. However, the courts tend to limit their power to
broader issues than those that will only affect a particular case. Thus,
the broadest policies are decided by legislatures, the narrowest ones by
agencies, and the remaining ones by courts .3 The role that the courts
generally play in making law has been expressed as follows:
[O]ur courts have made most of our law, the mass of our common law. Courts
do make law. It is their business to make law. At least that is true of appellate
courts.
Some say that this system of judge-made law does not fit in with the ideal
of a government by law and not by men. But who is to make our laws if not men.
It is because there are none that are really in point, or because there are too
many and they point confusedly in different directions, or perhaps some ancient
33 43 CoNG. REC. 21 (1908).
34 An example of the failure of Congress to legislate was the matter of providing equal
protection. Until recently, the vacuum as to such matters was filled by the Court.
35 Sherman Anti-Trust matters is an example.
36 For many years, Congress seemed to invite the Court's management of matters in-
volving state taxation where interstate commerce was involved.
37 Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 221 (1917).
38 DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TEXT 556-57 (1959).
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precedent does seem to apply but is illogical, or contrary to common under-
standing, out of keeping with the spirit of the time .... 39
PRECEDENT
Precedent is not the terminal point of the law. It does not and
should not forever fix its meaning. It is a guide, the best we have as
to what the law should be, but it is not the irrevocable answer. "The
inn that shelters for the night is not the journey's end. The law like
the traveler must be ready for the morrow. It must have a principle
of growth. '40
Chief Justice Taney, in 1849, pointed out that the opinion of the
Court in construing the Constitution is always open to discussion
when such construction appears to be in error, and that precedent
should depend on the force of the reasoning that supports such judicial
authority. 41 In 1842, Justice Story said that decisions are often re-
viewed, reversed, and modified by the courts themselves whenever
they are found to be in error.42 Justice Brandeis' dissent in Burnet v.
Coronado Oil and Gas Co.,43 in saying that the Court has yielded to
better reasoning and has recognized the process of trial and error as
an appropriate judicial function, is to the same effect.
The rules and principles of case law, according to Mr. Justice
Cardozo, have always been considered as tentative theories which have
continually been reexamined by the courts. When the accepted rule
yields what appears to be an unjust result, the rule has been consid-
ered again by the judiciary. Thus, if pushing logic to its extreme
would lead to an unjust result, the law should not be followed be-
cause justice is the ultimate objective of the law. It has been stated
that when the law results in the denial of any remedy, it may have
the beauty of logic but the ugliness of injustice.45 Mr. Justice Holmes
viewed logic as but one of the factors to be considered in the devel-
opment of the law. Some of the factors which operate to determine
the law besides the legal syllogism are the necessities of the time; the
39 The Role of the Supreme Court, 44 A.B.A.J. 534, 536 (1958).
40 CARDOZO, THE GROWTH OF THE LAW 20 (1924).
41 Passenger Cases, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 283 (1849) (dissenting opinion).
42 Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842).
43 285 U.S. 393 (1932) (dissenting opinion).
44 CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROcEss 23 (1921).
45 Mitchell, The Anatomy and Pathology of the Constitution, 67 JURIDICAL REV. 1,
20 (1955).
THE SUPREME COURT: STATESMEN AND JUSTICES
prevailing moral and political theories; the public policy; and the
prejudices of the judges.46
Mr. Justice Cardozo enunciates the directions principles may take
in determining the growth of the law. Analogy might be most persua-
sive in one situation, historical development might be of more impor-
tance in another, custom and tradition might tip the scales in the next,
while justice, morality, mores, and social welfare (the methods of
sociology) might be the deciding factors in another judicial determi-
nation.47
It would not be practicable to adopt a rule that a judicial interpretation of the
Constitution by the Supreme Court could not be modified by a later decision;
that such a change should come about only by constitutional amendment. The
power of the dead over the living would be too far extended.
48
INTERPRETATION
The Constitution, consisting of less than 7,000 words, has its par-
ticularizations and its generalizations. The two houses of Congress,
entitlement of each state to two senators, and the oath of the President
are particularizations or specifics, and they have a fixed meaning. Due
process, equal protection and liberty are generalizations, or broad con-
cepts, that acquire new meanings as society's values change and as
new generations mature. "A word is not a crystal, transparent, and
unchanged, it is the skin of a living thought and may vary greatly in
color and content according to the circumstances and the time in
which it is used."' 49 The evolving meaning of words in the Constitu-
tion finds expression in the following:
It is no answer to say that the particular need was not apprehended a century
ago, or to insist that what the provision of the Constitution meant to the vision
of that day it must mean to the vision of our time. If by the statement that what
the Constitution meant at the time of its adoption it means today, it is intended
to say that the great clauses of the Constitution must be confined to the interpre-
tation which the framers, with the conditions and outlook of their time, would
have placed upon them, the statement carries its own refutation. It was to guard
against such a narrow interpretation that Chief Justice Marshall uttered the
memorable warning-"We must never forget, that it is a constitution we are
4 6 HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 1 (1881).
47 CARDOZO, op. cit. supra note 44 at 30-1.
48 Menez, A Brief in Support of the Supreme Court, 54 Nw. U.L. REv. 30, 53 (1959),
citing an address by former Associate Justice Stanley Reed before the Bar of the City
of New York.
4 9 Towne v. Eisner, 245 U.S. 418, 425 (1918).
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expounding, a constitution intended to endure for ages to come, and, conse-
quently, to be adapted to the various crises of human affairs."5 0
Many feel that the gift of the Constitution lies in the generality and
adaptability of its language. Whether or not this is true, the fact
remains that the imprecise nature of constitutional grants and limita-
tions has caused the Court to be in a "continuous process of consti-
tution-making."'
How may the interpretation that the framers meant to give be de-
termined? Is it the intention of all, some, a majority, or just the one
who expressed himself? Is it the intention of those who ratified?
Maybe no intention can be discovered. Possibly the compromises that
led to a particular provision deliberately made the provision vague
so as not to precipitate a disagreement that could not be resolved.
How the framers would have decided the meaning of a word or pro-
vision might be of benefit to a contemporary determination of the
meaning of the phrase or word, but only if the court directed its atten-
tion to analyzing what the framers would have decided if they had
given the matter particular attention, and if they had viewed the mat-
ter in terms of the particular problem in contemporary circumstances,
using the current understanding of the language in the context of the
Constitution as presently comprehended.
DECISION MAKING
While the justices are men sworn to defend the Constitution, diffi-
culty arises in determining whose values, whose interpretations, whose
philosophy and what precedents are to be followed. Should Justice
Douglas have warmly embraced all of Justice Sutherland's opinions
and philosophy? Should Justice Black have undeviatingly followed
the law enunciated by Justice McReynolds? The Court in its time
has developed different philosophies, different approaches, and differ-
ent lines of reasoning which can be used as needed. "[O]nce a judicial
opinion rationalizes such an order . . . the principle then lies about
like a loaded weapon ready for the hand of any authority that can
bring forth a plausible claim. ., "
The ideal would be for the Justice to write his opinion as a prin-
50 Home Building & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 442-43 (1934), citing Mc-
Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 407 (1819).
51 Supra note 27 at 540.
52 Korcniatsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 246 (1944) (Jackson, J., dissenting).
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cipled decision which rests upon general and neutral reasons that
would apply to any immediate result in the future.5  However, Pro-
fessor Alexander Bickel has stated that there can be very few princi-
ples of this kind because of the nature of our society and the con-
sensual basis of its effective law.5
4
The provisions of the Constitution have their essence in substance
and not in form, and are to be considered in terms of their origin
and growth.55 The law is not an exact science. The idea that the law
of the land is a complete and perfect set of maxims to be applied to
every controversy vanished many years ago.56 Law is prophesy of
what the court will do in the future. It furnishes the basis for decision,
and is the bridge between the old and the new.57 Present dominant
principles must maintain a thread of consistency with the past so that
there will be an adequate point of departure for the transition from
the present to the future.5"
GOALS
The individual members of the Court decide the values the Court
should advance and the role or roles the Court should play. The Court
of Chief Justice Marshall emphasized federalism and strong central
government. The consensus of the Court of Chief Justice Taney was
that the police power and the reserved powers of the states were
particularly worth promoting and advancing. The Courts of Chief
Justice Waite and of Chief Justice Fuller promoted a philosophy con-
sistent with, and conducive to, the rise of industrialism.59 The Warren
Court finds its goals in the protection and advancement of political and
civil rights and freedoms.
53 WECHSLER, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REv.
1 (1959).
54 Bickel, The Supreme Court 1960 Term, Foreword: The Passive Virtues, 75 HARV.
L. REV. 40, 48 (1961).
55 Gompers v. United States, 233 U.S. 604, 610 (1914).
56 ROBSON, JUSTICE AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 432 (3rd ed. 1951).
57 Holmes, The Path of the Law, COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 173 (1921).
58 McKay, The Supreme Court and its Lawyer Critics, 28 FORDHAM L. REV. 615, 634
(1960).
59 Promotion of this philosophy can be seen in Court decisions holding that corpora-
tions are persons within the meaning of the fourteenth amendment (Santa Clara Coun-
ty v. Southern Pacific R. Co., 118 U.S. 394, 1886), and that the income tax law was
unconstitutional despite a century of precedent (Pollock v. Farmers Loan and Trust
Co., 157 U.S. 429, 1895).
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While judicial passivism formerly was the attitude generally with
reference to civil and political rights, and a form of judicial activism
was the attitude with reference to economic matters, the attitudes have
been reversed since the thirties. Where the legislative or executive
action has the effect of impinging upon civil and political rights, the
present assumption is that the action is contrary to the Constitution,
and the Court will protect the rights of the people which the other
branch of government failed to protect by its interpretation of the
Constitution. The Court presumes validity in economic matters, con-
trary to its pre-1937 philosophy, and does not presume validity in
voting or free speech or equal protection matters.
The Court no longer purports to discover the law. As part of the
political process, it helps supply the contours to our democratic proc-
esses by defining and redefining the values that go to make up the
same. Its opinions are a means of teaching the ways of attaining the
democratic goals and the pitfalls that must be avoided to attain these
goals. The Court's concern extends beyond merely that which is pro-
hibited. The Court has changed
from an "aristocratic censor" to "keeper of the nation's conscience" from, that
is to say, a "negative" check on government to an "affirmative" instrument of
governance. This is being accomplished in two ways: by progressive interpre-
tation of constitutional terms and by interpretation of statutes.60
Occasionally, the Court attempted to interpret the national conscience
in the past. Justice Harlan, in his dissent in Plessy v. Ferguson,1 mis-
interpreted it in his opposition to "separate but equal." He was years
ahead of his time. In Dred Scott v. Sanford,6 2 the Court grossly mis-
interpreted the nation's conscience and in so doing, severely damaged
its prestige.
Professor McCloskey speaks of a balance between the doctrine of
popular sovereignty and the rule of law. He believes that the Court
has become a revered institution which has both judicial and political
functions, which is sensitive to, but is not bound by, popular opinion,
and which shares its duty of statesmanship while being aware of its
capacities. 2 When the Court satisfies popular expectations, it is prob-
60 Miller, The Changing Role of the United State Supreme Court, 25 MODERN L.
REv. 641, 642 (1962).
61163 U.S. 537 (1895).
6260 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
63 MCCLOSKEY, THE AMERICAN SUPREME COURT 23 (1960).
THE SUPREME COURT: STATESMEN AND JUSTICES I3
ably doing so as a means to building its prestige so in turn it can
successfully achieve its goals.64 The following relates one view of
what the general objectives of the Court are:
The judges are not experts by virtue of their training or commissions in the
field of economics or public policy. They are, however, the special guardians
of legal procedure, of the standards of decency and fair play that should be the
counterpoise to the extensive affirmative powers of government. [T]here falls
to the courts a vital role in the preservation of an open society, whose govern-
ment is to remain both responsive and responsible. 65
ANSWERS
Since the thirties, the Court has been most active in giving added
meaning to due process and equal protection. Federalism has suffered
because of the failure of the states to provide solutions to problems
that demanded answers in terms of current concepts of fairness and
equality.
Powell v. Alabama66 and Brown v. Mississippi 7 were products of
changing moral values, of a feeling that the voting strength of the
criminally accused was not a factor in securing justice on the local
level, of a feeling that the democratic goal is not merely the rule of
law, but justice under the rule of law, of a feeling that low stand-
ards of criminal justice had to be raised to conform to the worth of
the individual, and of a revulsion to the rising tides of totalitarianism.
Rights of ethnic minorities, particularly the Negro, began to de-
velop in the context of the fourteenth amendment with the recogni-
tion that discrimination would be slow in disappearing as long as the
political processes denied the power to participate by denying the
ballot. Factors which served as catalysts to this realization were the
rising influence of the African nations in the United Nations, the par-
ticipation of the minorities in the wars, movement brought on by rapid
transportation in a shrinking world, and automation and mechaniza-
tion. When Congress could not, or would not, act on matters of racial
equality, it was necessary for some agency of government to remove,
or at least relieve, the pressures.
The Court moved into the field of legislative apportionment because
the political agencies involved approved dilution of the individual's
64 Shapiro, The Supreme Court and Constitutional Adjudication: Of Politics and
Neutral Principles, 31 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 587 (1963).
65 Fruend, The Supreme Court under Attack, 25 U. Pin. L. REV. 1, 5-6 (1963).
06 287 U.S. 45 (1932). 67 297 U.S. 278 (1936).
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vote and offered him no method by which he could secure equality.
The routine political process did not work. Our current standard of
equality required removal of this negation of democratic government.
It has been said that:
[so long as the Federal Government continues to operate on a broad and flexible
constitution capable of accommodating change in the world around us and on
a philosophy that government is an instrument to accomplish the ends of society,
while state governments operate on a nineteenth century statute masking as
a constitution and a philosophy that government is no more than a policeman
and a necessary evil, we may expect that continuation of the centralization of
government power in the Federal government.68
It is true that the law does not provide a remedy for every wrong.
This does not mean that the law should not keep trying. It does not
mean that in redefining, reshaping, and furthering the values of our
democratic society the Supreme Court should not, where possible,
use the tools and doctrines of the law to fashion a remedy and thereby
move toward attainment of the broad objectives of that most impor-
tant living instrument of government, the Constitution.
68 Flynn, The Crisis of Federalism: Who is Responsible? 51 A.B.A.J. 229, 232 (1965).
